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TWO DADS ARE BETTER THAN ONE: THE SUPREME
COURT OF VIRGINIA'S DECISION IN L.F. V BREIT
AND WHY VIRGINIA'S ASSISTED CONCEPTION
STATUTE SHOULD ALLOW GAY COUPLES TO
LEGALLY PARENT A CHILD TOGETHER
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2012, Roanoke Athletic Club in Virginia revoked a fam-
ily club membership from two dads and their two-year-old son Ol-
iver, after discovering that the two dads were gay and that they
did not qualify for club membership.' William Trinkle, Juan Gra-
nados, and Oliver applied for membership at the athletic club so
that they could enjoy the summer by the pool as a family.! Trinkle
purchased a family membership and club officials approved his
application, but soon after the family started using the facilities,
the operations director contacted the couple.' The director re-
voked their membership because they did not qualify under the
club's definition of a family.4 Thus, Trinkle, Granados, and Oliver
were denied a family membership simply because of Trinkle's and
Granados' sexual orientations. In addition, Oliver was denied the
access available to children of heterosexual couples.' Although the
athletic club later changed its definition of a family to allow fami-
lies like Trinkle, Granados, and Oliver to gain membership, this
event highlights one of the many problems gay dads face in Vir-
ginia as a result of the current state of Virginia law regarding le-
gal parentage.6 Virginia law essentially prohibits two gay dads,
1. Virginia Fitness Club to Allow Gay Parents to Join After Lawsuit, FoxNEWS.COM
(July 5, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/05/virginia-fitness-club-to-allow-gay-
parents-to-join-after-lawsuit/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; Charlene Gomes, Partners as Parents: Challenges Faced by Gays Denied Mar-
riage, 63 HUMANIST 14, 14-15 (2003).
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such as Trinkle and Granados, from both establishing legal rights
over their children.
As of 2012, there were more than 110,000 same-sex couples in
the United States raising children.! One way same-sex couples
become parents is through assisted reproductive technology
("ART").' ART includes all fertility treatments in which both the
egg and the sperm are manipulated." Typically, ART involves
removing eggs from a woman's ovaries, combining the ovaries
with sperm in a laboratory, and placing the eggs in a woman's
body." ART allows gay couples to create a family through gesta-
tional surrogacy. Gestational surrogacy is a treatment process
where a woman, designated as the surrogate, carries to term a
fertilized egg not genetically related to her." One of the men in a
same-sex couple may choose to donate his own sperm, thus allow-
ing one partner to have a genetic connection to the child." Before
initiating any gestational surrogacy treatment, the surrogate and
the intended parents typically form a surrogacy contract. A sur-
rogacy contract usually requires the surrogate to surrender any
legal rights to the child once the child is born." Although gesta-
tional surrogacy allows two gay men hoping for a child to take
part in the creation of a child, and a surrogacy contract has the
potential to terminate the legal parental rights of the surrogate,
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008); id. § 63.2-1225 (2012) (limiting adoption to mar-
ried couples and unmarried individuals).
8. Press Release, Williams Inst., As Overall Percentage of Same-Sex Couples Raising
Children Declines, Those Adopting Almost Doubles-Significant Diversity Among Lesbian
and Gay Families (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edulpress/
press-releases/as-overall-percentage-of-same-sex-couples-raising-children-declines-those-
adopting-almost-doubles-significant-diversity-among-lesbian-and-gay-families/.
9. Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the Two-Dad Family: Issues Arising in
Interstate Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 895 (2011).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL
SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/
ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf.
11. Id. This specific technique is called in vitro fertilization. Id.
12. Dominique Ladomato, Note, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting
Through Fee Payment Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 245, 247 (2012).
13. See id. at 247-48; Palmer, supra note 9 at 896; Diane S. Hinson, Is the VA Su-
preme Court Moving to the Left? VA Supreme Court Recognizes Paternity Rights of an Un-
married Father, CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS (Jan. 11, 2013), http://surrogacyguru
blog.com/post/40403688876/is-the-va-supreme-court-moving-to-the-left-va-supreme.
14. Ladomato, supra note 12 at 249 (citing Sample TS Contract, ALL ABOUT
SURROGACY, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample-contracts/TScontract.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014)).
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legal problems still arise when attempting to establish parentage
of the two dads.
Gestational surrogacy allows gay men to have a child with the
help of a surrogate and an egg donor, but it does not come with-
out legal, ethical, and social implications. One important question
that must be addressed is who the child's legal parents are." Vir-
ginia, along with many other states, has passed statutes regulat-
ing the legal status of children conceived through ARTs in an ef-
fort to address the legal questions arising from this new form of
reproductive technology." These Virginia statutes prohibit both
gay men from establishing legal parentage.
Specifically, Virginia Code section 20-156 limits the enforcea-
bility of surrogacy contracts based on the marital status of the in-
tended parents." The statute defines a surrogacy contract as "an
agreement between intended parents, a surrogate, and her hus-
band, if any."9 The code further defines intended parents as "a
man and a woman, married to each other."" These definitions
preclude homosexual couples from entering into a binding surro-
gacy contract thus inhibiting them from establishing legal
parenthood through ART. 20 Despite the hurdle that section 20-156
creates for homosexual couples on their path to parenthood
through surrogacy contracts, the Supreme Court of Virginia's de-
cision in L.F. v. Breit offers hope that homosexual couples will
have success in establishing legal parentage in Virginia.
In January 2013, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that an
unmarried paternal donor for in vitro fertilization had parental
rights over the resulting child in L.F. v. Breit.21 The court rea-
soned that Virginia's marital preference in surrogacy contracts
resulting from assisted conception is designed to protect "an in-
tact family from the intervention from third-party strangers"-
15. Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage
for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 353, 354 (2011).
16. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 to -165 (2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
17. Id. § 20-156 (2008); Brooke D. Rodgers-Miller, Adam and Steve and Eve: Why Sex-
uality Segregation in Assisted Reproduction in Virginia Is No Longer Acceptable, 11 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 293, 293 (2005).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008).
19. Id.
20. See Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 293.
21. 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013).
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not to deprive a child of "a responsible, involved parent."2 As a
result of the Breit decision, the Virginia General Assembly passed
Virginia Code section 1-240.1. Section 1-240.1 states that "a par-
ent has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the
upbringing, education, and care of the parent's child."23 The hold-
ing in Breit and Virginia Code section 1-240.1 should open the
door for same-sex couples, in particular gay male couples who are
more vulnerable under the law, to contract surrogacy agreements
allowing them to assert parental rights.24
This comment examines whether gay men can have a child
through a surrogacy arrangement in Virginia and whether gay
men can retain parental rights through surrogacy contracts un-
der the Virginia Assisted Conception Act. The Virginia laws affect
gay males and gay females equally, but this comment addresses
the issues arising with same-sex couples in the context of gay
dads. Part II provides a background of surrogacy and specifically
discusses surrogacy in relation to same-sex couples. Part III pro-
vides a general background of adoption and the establishment of
parentage rights. Part IV describes the Assisted Conception Act,
the legislative history of the Act, and its consequences on gay
men. Part V discusses the January 2013 Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia decision, L.F. v. Breit. Part VI discusses how the holding in
Breit and Virginia Code section 1-240.1 can and should be applied
to homosexual couples in order to protect their fundamental con-
stitutional rights. Part VII recommends that to protect these
rights, Virginia should amend its definition of "intended parents"
in Virginia Code section 20-156 to include gay parents and to al-
low for second-parent adoption.
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND SURROGACY
ARTs provide individuals and couples opportunities to create a
child that they would not otherwise be able to create. There are
two types of infertility that lead people to use ARTs-functional
22. Id. at 723.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-240.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
24. Gay male couples are more vulnerable under the law than lesbian couples because
gay men do not adopt the traditional gender roles for parents. Palmer, supra note 9, at
899. Gay couples become the caretakers of a child and that is a role traditionally held by
women. Id. (citing Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-
Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 183,
192 (1995)).
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infertility and structural infertility. 25 Functional infertility occurs
when a man or woman cannot reproduce for a medical reason
such as age, endometrial polyps, pelvic infection, or not being able
to carry a baby to term in women, and semen abnormalities in
men.26 Structural infertility is not the result of a medical condi-
tion, but instead occurs when an individual needs a person of the
opposite sex's biological assistance to reproduce." Structural in-
fertility affects all gay couples looking to reproduce."
ARTs are a solution to both structural and functional infertili-
ty. ARTs "started out as an effort to help married couples fulfill
their dreams of having genetically related children [but] has,
within just a few short years, triggered a revolution about how we
think about parentage, marriage, and even gender identifica-
tion."" ARTs come in many forms, but they include all fertility
procedures where both the egg and the sperm are handled outside
of the body." The most popular form of ART is in vitro fertiliza-
tion. This is when eggs are removed from an ovary and combined
with sperm in a petri dish." After the embryo is created, it is im-
planted in a woman's uterus.2 Artificial insemination" and sur-
rogacy, although not technically ART because manipulation of the
eggs and sperm outside the body is not required, are generally
grouped with ARTs.34 Surrogacy is particularly associated with
25. Dana, supra note 15, at 359.
26. See id. (citing Margarete Sandelowski & Sheryl de Lacey, The Uses of a "Disease'"
Infertility as Rhetorical Vehicle, in INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON
CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 33, 35 (Martin C. Inhorn &
Frank van Balen eds., 2002); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisi-
ble Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 23-24 (2008)); Infer-
tility: Symptoms, Treatment, Diagnosis, UCLA HEALTH, http://obgyn.ucla.edulbody.cfm?
id=326 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
27. Dana, supra note 15, at 359.
28. Id.
29. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 1063 (2d ed. 2009) (quot-
ing Bruce Lord Wilder, Current Status of Assisted Reproduction Technology 2005: An
Overview and Glance at the Future, 39 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. Dana, supra note 15, at 360.
31. Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble With Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket:
Using a Property Rights Model to Resolve Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 144 (2009).
32. Id.
33. Artificial insemination means sperm is injected into the female by some unnatural
means. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 128-29 (9th ed. 2009).
34. Dana, supra note 15, at 360 (citing JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 5 (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12pdf/arond-art.pdf).
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ARTs since it utilizes artificial insemination or in vitro fertiliza-
tion in order to fulfill the pregnancy.
Surrogacy is a means of "curing" structural infertility for gay
men, single men, and also some straight couples." A woman, the
surrogate, agrees to carry the fetus in her womb and give birth to
a child that she does not plan on raising as her own." After the
birth, the woman gives the child to the intended parents-the
single man, the same-sex couple, or the heterosexual couple who
contracted with the surrogate."
There are two options for surrogacy: gestational or traditional."
Traditional surrogacy is when the surrogate agrees to be the egg
donor and the carrier of the child.40 For male gay couples, one of
the intended fathers can donate the sperm to artificially insemi-
nate the surrogate, but this is not always the case.4' Prospective
gay dads could also choose to use the sperm of a third-party donor
to inseminate the carrier. Although traditional surrogacy allows a
gay couple to choose one partner to be genetically related to the
child, the gay couple can also choose that neither of them be ge-
netically related to the child. In contrast, the egg donor and the
surrogate in traditionally surrogacy are the same woman, so the
surrogate will always be genetically related to the child she gives
birth to.
In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate and the intended par-
ents typically enter into an agreement called a surrogacy con-
tract.4 2 In uncontested cases, once the child is born, the surrogate
terminates her parental rights and the intended parents, the gay
dads, become the child's legal parents. In contested cases, an is-
sue appears if the surrogate decides to retain parental rights of
35. See id.
36. Id. (citing ARONS, supra note 34, at 6).
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Traditional Surrogacy: A Summary of the Traditional Surrogacy Process, ALL
ABouT SURROGACY, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/traditionalsurrogacy.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2014).
41. See Dana, supra note 15, at 360-61.
42. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millenni-
um: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating "Non-Traditional" Gestational Surrogacy Con-
tracts, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 673, 675 (2000).
43. Dana, supra note 15, at 361.
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the child that she gave birth to and is genetically linked." Tradi-
tional surrogacy agreements are typically not well received in
common law courts.
Many ethical and legal debates arise in traditional surrogacy
when the surrogate decides to retain parental rights. On the one
hand, the woman is depriving the intended parents of their child,
but on the other, many argue that surrogacy exploits the woman
by treating her as an object." One solution to this ethical dilem-
ma is gestational surrogacy, where a third-party donor egg as
well as a donor sperm is used. This form of surrogacy has become
more socially acceptable, since the surrogate is not genetically re-
lated to the child." Gestational surrogacy helps to curb character-
ization of a woman as an object and a baby-seller.48 It has also
transformed the legal debate surrounding surrogacy.
Gestational surrogacy contracts are significantly different from
traditional surrogacy contracts. Unlike traditional surrogacy, the
surrogate in gestational surrogacy has no biological relation to
the child she is carrying and giving birth to.50 Gestational surro-
gacy complicates the determination of who the legal parents of
the resulting child will be." In some circumstances where a third-
party egg and donor sperm are used, there can be up to five pro-
spective parents for the child." These five potential parents are
the intended mother, the intended father, the gestational mother,
the egg donor, and the sperm donor." For gay male couples, one of
the intended fathers can donate sperm, but there must be a third-
party egg donor.54 At most, only one of the intended fathers can be
genetically related to the child."
44. Id.
45. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 42, at 675.
46. Dana, supra note 15, at 361 (citing Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a
Commodity, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 76, 80 (1990)).
47. Cf. id. at 362.
48. Id. at 363.
49. Id. at 362 (citing Debora L. Spar, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITIcs DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 78, 82 (2006)).
50. Id. (citing Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context
of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 341 (1995)).
51. Id. at 363.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Gay male couples attempting to create a family not only face
obstacles in creating a child and establishing legal parentage, but
they also face financial obstacles. In both gestational and tradi-
tional surrogacy contracts, the intended parents must provide for
the surrogate's reasonable medical and ancillary expenses."
These costs can include payment to the surrogacy agency connect-
ing the parties, legal fees for the creation of the surrogacy con-
tract, and medical expenses." Despite the cost and complications,
gestational surrogacy is becoming more common, with about 1400
children born in 2008 through gestational surrogacy." Many of
those children are the son or daughter of gay couples.
III. ADOPTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PARENTAGE
Parentage is the lawful recognition of a child's parents." Par-
entage can be established through genetic relation to the child,
giving birth to the child, or adoption." Adoption is a viable option
for a homosexual male couple looking to have a child. Generally
adoption occurs in one of two ways: traditional adoption or sec-
ond-parent adoption." In traditional adoption, the identities of
the birth parents and the adoptive parents are unknown to each
other,62 and the couple or individual person adopts the child from
foster care or another child placement source." In contrast, in
second-parent adoption one partner or spouse already has paren-
tal rights over the child, and the other spouse or partner adopts
the child so that both partners have parental rights. Second-
parent adoption provides enormous benefits to the child, includ-
ing allowing the child to receive health benefits from both par-
ents, enabling parents to make important decisions regarding the
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 20-162(B)(3) (Cum. Supp.
2013).
57. Id. § 20-160(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2013); Dana, supra note 15, at 363.
58. Christopher White, Surrogates and Their Discontents, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Aug.
16, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/08/6137/.
59. See PETER NASH SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER, & HELENE S. SHAPO, FAMILY LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 285 (3d ed. 2012).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (2008).
61. Family Formation, EQUALITY VIRGINIA, http://www.equalityvirginia.org/what-we-
do/protecting-families/adoption/ (ast visited Apr. 14, 2014).
62. Traditional Adoption, ADOPTION.COM, http://encyclopedia.adoption.comlentry/trad
itional-adoption/359/1.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
63. Family Formation, supra note 61.
64. Id.
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child's health, and ensuring the child has another legally recog-
nized parent if one parent should die."
The Virginia Code does not explicitly prohibit same-sex couples
from adopting a child, but Virginia Code section 63.2-1225 ex-
cludes same-sex couples from its enumeration of individuals or
couples eligible to adopt a child.6 Section 63.2-1225 states that a
"married couple or an unmarried individual shall be eligible to
receive placement of a child for purposes of adoption."" Although
this section essentially precludes gay couples from adopting a
child, the court must also consider the "best interest of the child"
in determining the appropriate home for adoption.6 8 Although the
code does not directly enumerate factors for determining the "best
interest of the child" in section 63.2-1225, the code does enumer-
ate these factors for purposes of determining custody or visitation
arrangements in section 20-124.3." The "best interest" standard
established in section 20-124.3 can transfer to adoption.o These
factors include the age and physical and mental condition of the
child, the age and physical and mental condition of each parent,
the relationship between the parent and the child, the needs of
the child, the role the parent has played in the past and will play
in the future, the parent's ability to actively support the child, the
parent's willingness to have an active relationship with the child,
the child's preference, history of family abuse, and any other fac-
tors the court deems necessary." Nowhere in this section does the
law require the judge to consider the sexual orientation of the
parent.
Second-parent adoption is one way for a gay couple to legally
parent a child together, although currently it is not allowed in
Virginia. As of March 2014, potential parents can petition for see-
ond-parent adoption in fourteen states and the District of Colum-
65. Id.
66. VA. CODE. ANN. § 63.2-1225 (2012); see also FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, ADOPTION
AND FOSTER CARE, available at http://www.familyequality.org/_asset/OrqO5O/Adoption-and-
Foster-Care-FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 20.124.3 (2008).
70. Id.; Alison M. Schmieder, Best Interest and Parental Presumptions: Bringing
Same-Sex Custody Agreements Beyond Preclusion by the Federal Defense of Marriage Act,
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 293, 308-10 (2008); Family Formation, supra note 61.
71. Id,
2014) 1427
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bia." Seven states restrict second-parent adoption for same-sex
couples." Virginia is not one of those states. The Virginia Code
does not include a specific statutory provision for second-parent
adoption, but second-parent adoption is not exclusively banned."
The Virginia Code also does not include a specific provision
addressing the legal parentage of homosexual couples that use
ART. However, the evolution of the law determining the parent-
age of a child whose parents are unmarried is important to the
homosexual parentage discussion. Historically, there has been no
common law duty of a father to support his child if he is not mar-
ried to the child's mother.76 However, in 1952, Virginia passed leg-
islation requiring a father to support his child once paternity was
proven, but the father had to admit to paternity under oath."
This law was then revised to be less stringent in 1954, allowing
an out-of-court admission as proof of paternity in writing under
oath." This statute was repealed in 1988 and then re-codified at
the current Virginia Code section 20-49.1.79 Section 20-49.1 de-
fines legal parentage when a child's parents are unmarried."o It
allows for the establishment of paternity when the biological fa-
ther and mother enter into a voluntary written agreement made
under oath.8 ' In 1992, the statute was expanded to include pater-
nity revealed through genetic testing.8 2 Section 20-49.1 does not
72. Second Parent Adoption, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, http://www.familyequality.
org/getinformedlequality-maps/second-parent-adoption_1aws/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1200 (2012); Leslie M. Fenton & Ann Fenton, The
Changing Landscape of Second-Parent Adoptions, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Oct. 25,
2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/content/articles/fall20
11-changing-landscape-second-parent-adoptions.html; see also Family Formation, supra
note 61.
76. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 717 (Va. 2013).
77. Act of Apr. 3, 1952, ch. 584, 1952 Va. Acts 611 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-61.1 (1958)).
78. Act of Apr. 6, 1954, ch. 577, 1954 Va. Acts 350 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-61.1 (1958)).
79. Act of Apr. 20, 1988, ch. 866, 1988 Va. Acts 1025 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-49.1 to -49.8 (1988)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 516, 1992 Va. Acts 228 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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address the establishment of paternity by those who use assisted
conception."
IV. THE VIRGINIA STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT
In response to the increased use of ARTs, many states passed
statutes regulating reproduction with the use of these advanced
technologies, including Virginia, which adopted the Uniform Sta-
tus of Children of Assisted Conception Act ("USCACA")." In some
aspects, Virginia's response to ARTs is more progressive than
other states."5 For example, Virginia allows circuit courts to ap-
prove surrogacy contracts that statutorily comply with Virginia
Code section 20-160,86 whereas Louisiana will not honor any re-
muneration for surrogacy services." However, in other aspects,
Virginia's response to ARTs has been more conservative, especial-
ly with respect to the sexual orientation of the intended parents."
A. Adoption of Virginia Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act
Virginia adopted the USCACA in 1991, which became the Vir-
ginia Status of Children of Assisted Conception statute, otherwise
known as the Assisted Conception Act,8 as a response to the
83. Id.
84. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295; see DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., LEGAL
ISSUES CONCERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 3 (2012) [hereinafter ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION].
85. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Cum. Supp. 2013). To approve a surrogacy agreement
the following twelve requirements must be met: the court must have jurisdiction; a home
study of the intended parents and the surrogate has been conducted and filed with the
court; the surrogate and intended parents meet the standards of fitness that apply to
adoptive parents; the contract was voluntarily entered it; there is a guarantee of payment
of medical expenses; the surrogate has had one successful pregnancy; the intended parents
and surrogate have undergone physical and psychological evaluations; the intended moth-
er is unable to carry the child for medical reasons; at least one of the parents is expected to
be genetically related to the child; the surrogate's husband, if any, signs the agreement;
the parties have received counseling regarding surrogacy; and the agreement is not sub-
stantially detrimental to any affected persons. Id.
87. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295.
88. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008) (defining intended parents as "a man and a
woman, married to each other").
89. H.D. 1973, 1991 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1991); see ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION, supra note 84, at 3.
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Court of Appeals of Virginia decision in Welborn v. Doe.90 In Wel-
born a married couple used a third-party sperm donor to have a
child, and the husband asserted parental rights over the child.91
The court held that the only way for the husband, who was not
the biological father, to secure parental rights, was by divesting
the rights of the third-party donor and enacting the parental
rights of the husband through adoption."
The purpose of the USCACA, which Virginia adopted as its
own, was to ensure that a child created by an ART had two legal
parents when possible.9" The National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws drafted the USCACA in 1988.94 The
committee's mission was "to effect the security and well-being of
children born and living in our midst as a result of assisted con-
ception," which included the "use of such limited and monitored
surrogacy procedures as might be necessary to accomplish" the
committee's instructions." Under the provisions of the USCACA,
the "intended parents" in a surrogacy agreement are restricted to
"a man and woman, married to each other."" This requirement
reflects the committee's goal of protecting the interests of the
child by providing the child with two legal parents. However, this
provision harms unmarried couples, including homosexuals, who
wish to procreate using ARTs."
The statutory language of the Assisted Conception Act effectu-
ates the purpose of ensuring a child has two legal parents, but
discriminately limits these two parents to a man and woman who
are married. The Assisted Conception Act begins with a list of
definitions," and the definition that stands as an obstacle to gay
90. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. at 175, 736 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Welborn v. Doe, 10 Va. App.
631, 394 S.E. 2d 732 (1990)).
91. Id. at 733.
92. Id.
93. Robert C. Robinson & Paul M. Kurtz, Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Con-
ception Act: A View From the Drafting Committee, 13 NOVA L. REV. 491, 493 (1989); see
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 (2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
parentage/upa-final_2002.pdf.
94. Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 93, at 491.
95. Id. at 492.
96. Id. at 490 (quoting UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B
U.L.A. § 1 (Supp. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 496.
98. "Assisted conception" is defined as "a pregnancy resulting from any intervening
medical technology, whether in vivo or in vitro, which completely or partially replaces sex-
ual intercourse as the means of conception." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008). Medical tech-
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couples who wish to become parents through ARTs is the defini-
tion of "intended parents."" Virginia Code section 20-156 defines
"intended parents" through assisted conception as:
[A] man and a woman, married to each other, who enter into an
agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they will be
the parents of any child born to the surrogate through assisted con-
ception regardless of the genetic relationships between the intended
parents, the surrogate, and the child.100
Virginia Code section 20-160 allows circuit courts to approve sur-
rogacy contracts that comply with a list of qualifications, includ-
ing a surrogacy contract signed by the "intended parents," the
surrogate, and her husband.o' This section, read in connection
with the definitions section, effectively prevents gay couples from
forming a valid surrogacy contract under the statute. Section 20-
160 also requires the intended parents, the surrogate, and her
husband to fulfill the "standards of fitness applicable to adoptive
parents" and requires the surrogate be married with at least one
living child.0 2 The statute further requires the intended parents,
the surrogate, and her husband to undergo physical and psycho-
logical evaluations before the surrogacy contract can be ap-
proved.' Additionally, the statute indicates that "[alt least one of
the intended parents is expected to be the genetic parent of any
child resulting from the agreement."'0 4 Section 20-160 then lists a
number of requirements for the court to find in order to approve a
surrogacy contract, and section 20-162 provides the circuit courts
with guidance as to approval of contracts that do not necessarily
meet all of those requirements.'o
The Virginia Code offers guidelines for how courts should treat
surrogacy contracts not approved by the courts in sections 20-162
and 20-158. Section 20-162 allows the surrogate to finalize the
nologies the state considers to be "assisted conception" include "artificial insemination by
donor, cryopreservation of gametes and embryos, in vitro fertilization, uterine embryo lay-
age, embryo transfer, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal ovum transfer."
Id. Additionally, the statute restricts the definition of "compensation" to medical and an-
cillary expenses and requires the surrogate to wait three days to release her parental
rights. Id.; see id. § 20-162(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
99. Id. § 20-156 (2008).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 20-160(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
102. Id. § 20-160(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
103. Id. § 20-160(B)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
104. Id. § 20-160(B)(9) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
105. Id. §§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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surrogacy contract if one of the intended parents is genetically re-
lated to the child by delivering the child to the intended parents
and signing a consent form, or alternatively allows the surrogate
to break the surrogacy contract by retaining her parental rights if
she is genetically related to the child.106 Under section 20-158(E),
in a non-approved surrogacy contract, the genetic father of a
child, often a gay man who donates his sperm, is precluded from
any parental rights if the surrogate is married and decides to re-
tain her parental rights.o' Thus, in a non-approved surrogacy
contract, if the surrogate is married, her husband is part of the
contract, the surrogate is genetically related to the child, and the
surrogate decides to retain her parental rights to the child, the
intended parents, often the prospective gay dads, no longer have
any parental rights over the child.' 8 The surrogate and her hus-
band in this circumstance would be considered the parents of the
child.' 9 Sections 20-162 and 20-158 thus allow the circuit court to
deny a homosexual male his parental rights as result of these ex-
plicit provisions."0
B. Parentage on Birth Certificates
Virginia Code section 32.1-261 defines the requirements for a
new birth certificate after adoption or proof of paternity."' The is-
suance of a new birth certificate after surrogacy or adoption is
limited based on marital status."2 Section 32.1-261 states that
birth certificates for children born through surrogacy shall be is-
sued in compliance with sections 20-160 and 20-158, which deny
homosexuals parental rights."'
Virginia is required to issue a new birth certificate listing both
of the partners as parents only if a state or foreign country has
certified a decree of adoption that includes the same-sex couple as
106. Id. § 20-162(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013); see id. § 20-158(D) (2008).
107. Id. § 20-158(E)(2) (2008).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 297.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-261 (2011).
112. Id. But cf. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 371 (Va. 2005) ("[There is
nothing in the statutory scheme that precludes recognition of same-sex couples as 'adop-
tive parents.'").
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2008); id. § 20-160 (Cum. Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN. §
32.1-261 (2011).
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parents."4 Virginia requires that the State Registrar establish a
new birth certificate for those born out of state if an adoption re-
port from any state or foreign country or a certified decree of
adoption is supplied."' This provision allows homosexual couples
to be legal parents of a child together if they had a second-parent
adoption in another state and then moved to Virginia and re-
quested a new birth certificate for their child. Under section 32.1-
261, Virginia must then recognize that adoption on the new birth
certificate.1 16
A new birth certificate can also be issued if there is evidence,
as may be required by the Office of Vital Records, proving that
paternity has been legitimated or that the Commonwealth has
proven paternity of that person by final order."' This provision al-
lows for a gay man who is biologically related to a child to be
placed on the birth certificate. Finally, the statute requires that,
"[a] surrogate consent and report form as authorized by § 20-
162.... contain[s] sufficient information to identify the original
certificate of birth and to establish a new certificate of birth in
the names of the intended parents.""' This provision allows for
married couples or single parents to be placed on the birth certifi-
cate, but not gay couples, since a court cannot approve their sur-
rogacy contracts under sections 20-160 and 20-162."9
C. The Assisted Conception Act and Homosexual Couples
Same-sex couples do not fit within the confines of the Assisted
Conception Act as parents.120 Both Virginia Code sections 20-160
and 20-162 require that the intended parents are a party to the
surrogacy contract, and section 20-156 requires that these in-
tended parents be "a man and a woman, married to each other."'2 '
These provisions allow a court to approve a surrogacy contract
based on marital status, preventing homosexual couples from en-
114. Id. § 32.1-261 (2011); see Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 371, 372.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-26.1 (2011).
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. §§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
120. Id. § 20-156 (2008).
121. Id.; id. §§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
2014] 1433
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
forcing a surrogacy contact.'22 In effect, these provisions of the As-
sisted Conception Act affect homosexual couples, who cannot
marry in Virginia,2 3 by deeming them per se unfit parents.124
Although the Assisted Conception Act discussed above only ap-
plies to married intended parents, there is no case law or statute
that prohibits a single man from entering into an unapproved
surrogacy agreement. Thus, either one of the partners of a homo-
sexual couple can enter into a surrogacy contract as a single man
in order to have a child.'25 If the intended father is genetically re-
lated to the child through the use of his sperm, then his name can
be effortlessly placed on the child's birth certificate, as long as the
surrogate is not married.126 If the surrogate is married, then an
Order of Parentage needs to be obtained, in which a DNA test es-
tablishes that the intended father is the biological father and the
surrogate's husband is not.127 If the intended father is, in fact, the
biological father, then his name is placed on the child's birth cer-
tificate.'" Getting the biological father's name on the birth certifi-
cate is the easy part.
In Virginia, getting the surrogate off the birth certificate as the
mother while adding another a homosexual partner to the birth
certificate is where the trouble begins.' Single-parent adoption
allows the surrogate to be taken off the birth certificate if the in-
tended father was not already named on the original birth certifi-
cate.' Also, if the surrogate is not genetically related to the child,
an Order of Non-Parentage can remove the surrogate from the
birth certificate.
122. See L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 717, 721 (Va. 2013).
123. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A.
124. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 297 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
446-47 (1972)).
125. Assisted Reproductive Technology Options for Same-Sex Parents in Virginia,QUINN LAW CENTERS, http://www.quinnlawcenters.com/law-centers/adoption-and-surrog
acy/reproduction/same-sex-options (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter ARTs for Same-
Sex Parents].
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-261(2) (2011).
127. Id. §§ 20-49.1, -49.8 (2008).
128. Id. § 20-49.8(C) (2008); id. § 32.1-269 (2008).
129. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1201 (2012); Assisted Reproductive Technology Options for
Single Parents in Virginia, QUINN LAw CENTERS, http://www.quinnlawcenters.com/law-
centers/adoption-and-surrogacy/reproduction/single-parent-optional (last visited Apr. 14,
2014) [hereinafter ARTs for Single Parents].
131. ARTs for Single Parents, supra note 130. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158
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A court can enter an Order of Non-Parentage after DNA testing
establishing that the gestational carrier, a surrogate who carries
a child from both a donated egg and sperm, is not the genetic par-
ent of a child.132 This order terminates any claim by the surrogate
for parental rights.3"' Failure to enter an Order of Non-Parentage
would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution.3 4 If a man can use DNA
testing to get relief from parental rights under the Virginia Code,
then so should a woman.'3 Although this order is necessary to
protect a surrogate's constitutional right, as of 2012, a Non-
Parentage Order in Virginia has not been successfully executed."
Even if the surrogate is removed from the birth certificate, a
gay couple cannot, under Virginia law, add the non-biologically
related parent to the birth certificate because the couple is not
married and there is no second-parent adoption in Virginia.'"' The
best outcome available in Virginia is that the same-sex couple can
request a Joint Custody and Co-Guardianship Order by a court,
but entry of this order is at the court's discretion and it still does
not establish both gay dads as parents.' Additionally, Virginia
does not allow second-parent adoptions for any couple-gay or
straight.' For the second parent to be added to the birth certifi-
cate, the family must move to another state that allows second-
parent adoption.'4 0 Then the second parent, gay or straight, can be
added to a birth certificate after the couple moves back to Virgin-
ia, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause forces the Depart-
ment of Vital Records to abide by the other state's adoption or-
der."' This is an option for homosexual couples to establish legal
parentage, but it is not reasonable since it requires the couples to
(2008); Colleen Quinn, The Single's & Same-Sex Couple's Guide to Building a Family in
Virginia, GAYRVA.COM (July 30, 2012), http://www.gayrva.com/lifestyle/the-singles-same-
sex-couples-guide-to-building-a-family-in-virginia/.
132. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125; Quinn, supra note 131.
133. Quinn, supra note 131.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Based on the author's research, there is no record of a successful Non-
Parentage order as of 2014.
137. See ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125.
138. Id.
139. Id.; Fenton & Fenton, supra note 75.
140. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125.
141. Id.
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reside in another state for a period of time for the sole purpose of
getting a second-parent adoption. Thus, homosexual male part-
ners cannot attain legal parentage of a child together in Virginia
because they are not married and there is no second-parent adop-
tion.
V. L.F. V. BREIT
In January 2013, Virginia took a significant step towards rec-
ognizing the rights of unmarried parents who participate in as-
sisted conception with the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in
L.F. v. Breit.142 In Breit, the court interpreted the Assisted Con-
ception Act, Virginia Code sections 20-156 through 20-164, con-
cluding that the right of a child to have two parents is more im-
portant than the state's goal in preserving and promoting
traditional marriage. 1
A. The Lower Court's Approach to Parentage of a Child Created
Through ART
In L.F. v. Breit, an unmarried father filed a petition for parent-
age of child he conceived with an unmarried mother through in
vitro fertilization.144 Beverley Mason and William D. Breit were in
a long-term relationship and lived together several years as an
unmarried couple when they decided to have a child together
through in vitro fertilization using Breit's sperm and Mason's
egg.' 41 Prior to the child's birth, Mason and Breit filed a written
custody and visitation agreement providing Breit with visitation
rights and stating that those rights were in the best interest of
the child. 146 On July 13, 2009, Mason gave birth to a daughter,
L.F.'4 ' Breit was present at the birth and named on the birth cer-
142. See generally 736 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 2013).
143. Id. at 722; Andrew Vorzimier, Unmarried Sperm Provider Has Constitutional
Right to Assert Parental Rights, THE SPIN DOCTOR (Jan. 14, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.
eggdonor.com/blog/2013/01/14/unmarried-sperm-provider-constitutional-assert-parental-
rights/.
144. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
145. Id.
146. Id. A written custody agreement, such as the one Breit and Mason entered into, is
the same as what attorneys in Virginia are recommending to gay couples as their best out-
come for joint parental rights in the state. See Assisted Reproductive Technology Options,
supra note 125.
147. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
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tificate as the father.14 Breit and Mason named the child after
Mason's paternal grandmother and Breit's maternal grandmoth-
er, and the couple hyphenated the child's last name as a combina-
tion of both their surnames.
After the child's birth, the couple entered a jointly executed
"Acknowledgment of Paternity" agreement, which stated that
Breit was the legal and biological father of the child.' Additional-
ly, the couple mailed birth announcements together, naming both
as parents to the child.'"' They lived together as a family for the
next four months.' The couple then separated and Breit paid
child support to Mason and maintained the child's health insur-
ance." Breit also established a relationship with the child by vis-
iting her on weekends and holidays. 4
In August 2010, Mason terminated all contact between Breit
and the child."' In response, Breit filed a petition for custody and
visitation in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
for the City of Virginia Beach and Mason responded with a mo-
tion to dismiss.15 The court dismissed Breit's petition without
prejudice."' Breit then filed a petition to determine parentage
and establish custody and visitation in the Circuit Court for the
City of Virginia Beach under Virginia Code section 20-49.2.15
Breit filed a motion for summary judgment, in which he argued
that the written Acknowledgment of Paternity that he and Mason
agreed to under Virginia Code section 20-49.1(B)(2) was binding
in establishing his parental rights of the child."' The court denied
his motion for summary judgment and dismissed by nonsuit the
remainder of his petition seeking custody and visitation.0 Breit
appealed."' The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's deci-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 715-16.
159. Id. at 716.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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sion."' The court of appeals held that a sperm donor is not barred
from filing a parentage action to establish paternity of a child of
assisted conception when the donor donated for the purpose of
having a child with the mother and the mother entered into the
Acknowledgment of Paternity voluntarily.6 3
An explanation of the court's reasoning requires a brief over-
view of Virginia Code sections 20-49.1(B)(2) and 20-158(A)(3).
Section 20-158(A)(3) states that a sperm donor cannot be the par-
ent of child conceived through assisted conception, unless the do-
nor is the husband of the gestational mother.1 4 Section 20-
49.1(B)(2) states that a parent and child relationship between a
child and a man can be established in a written Acknowledgment
of Paternity agreement between the mother and father. 6 5 The
court of appeals "harmonized" section 20-49.1(B)(2) and the writ-
ten "Acknowledgment of Paternity" agreement entered into by
the couple, with section 20-158(A)(3).' 6 6 The court noted that this
result was necessary to ensure consistency with the "the intent of
the legislature to ensure that all children born in the Common-
wealth have a known legal mother and legal father."' The court
concluded that it would be ridiculous to preclude a father from es-
tablishing legal parentage of a child conceived by assisted concep-
tion just because he was considered a "donor."168
Mason appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that
the court of appeals erred in "harmonizing" these two Virginia
Code sections.'" Mason also argued that the Acknowledgment of
Paternity entered into by the couple was void and that Breit
lacked standing for asserting parentage.' Breit argued that Vir-
ginia Code sections 20-158(A)(3) and 32.1-257(D) are unconstitu-
tional because they violate Breit's protected "liberty rights of
equal protection and due process.""
162. Id. (citing Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (Va. Ct. App. 2011)).
163. Id. (quoting Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (2008).
165. Id. § 20-49.1 (2008).
166. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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B. The Supreme Court of Virginia's Opinion
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with Mason's argu-
ment that Breit had no parental rights because Breit was never
married to Mason and the child was conceived through assisted
conception. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the unmarried father's funda-
mental right to the care, custody, and control of his child, despite
his marital status.'72 The court emphasized that Breit was an in-
volved and interested parent who voluntarily executed an Ac-
knowledgment of Paternity with the child's mother."'
1. The Virginia Assisted Conception Act
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Mason's argument that
the Assisted Conception Act be interpreted under its plain mean-
ing. Virginia Code section 20-164 states, "A child whose status as
a child is declared or negated by [chapter 9] is the child only of
his parent or parents as determined under this chapter ... and,
when applicable, ... § 20-49.1 et seq.... for all purposes . . . ."
The court found that Mason's argument neglected this provision
of the statute, and since section 20-164 explicitly references sec-
tion 20-49.1, the two sections must be read in "harmony" with one
another.' Section 20-49.1 provides guidelines for how a parent-
child relationship may be established between a child and a man.
The section allows a man to establish parentage over a child if
there is a "voluntary written statement of the father and mother
made under oath acknowledging paternity.""7 Mason and Breit
entered into one of these agreements after the child's birth. 7
The court also rejected Mason's argument that, despite a men-
tion of Virginia Code section 20-49.1 in the Assisted Conception
Act, the written agreement is null and void under the plain mean-
ing of section 20-49.1'17 Mason claimed that section 20-49.1 is only
applicable to existing parent-child relationships, not to the estab-
172. Id. at 721.
173. Id. at 721-22.
174. Id. at 718 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
175. Id. at 718, 720.
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1(B) (2008).
177. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
178. Id. at 718.
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lishment of new parentage rights."' The court disagreed, conclud-
ing that the statute expressly allows for parentage rights to be in-
itially established with a written agreement under section 20-
49.1.180
Mason also argued that Breit should be denied parental rights
despite the Acknowledgment of Paternity entered into under sec-
tion 20-49.1 because unmarried sperm donors cannot establish
parental rights under section 20-158(A)(3)."' The court harmo-
nized sections 20-158(A)(3) and 20-49.1(B) because section 20-
49.1 is referenced in the Assisted Conception Act and section 20-
158(A)(3) is a part of that act.'' The court noted that the two
statutes must be read together so as to avoid conflict since they
address the same subject.'" The court determined that sections
20-49.1(B)(1) and 20-158(A)(3) conflict, because under section 20-
49.1(B)(1), a gestational mother could force parental responsibili-
ties on a sperm donor, or under section 20-49.1(B)(1) a sperm do-
nor, could establish parental rights above the mother's objection,
which would go against the intent of the statute.8 4 Thus, the
court concluded that the sperm donor, aided only by the results of
genetic testing, may not establish parentage.' However, the use
of Virginia Code section 20-49.1(B)(2), as with the voluntary
agreement used by the couple in this case, does not cause a con-
flict with Virginia Code section 20-158(A)(3).186
The court stated that although the Assisted Conception Act
was written with married couples in mind, its purpose is to pro-
tect cohesive family units from third-party donors' potential in-
trusion.' Breit is not the third-party intruder that the Act was
meant to exclude, because Breit was the person whom Mason
originally intended to be the child's father, she treated Breit as
the child's father for a length of time, and she voluntarily
acknowledged Breit as the legal father in the Acknowledgment of
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 719.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 720.
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Paternity.' Breit also had a relationship with the child, and pro-
vided for her financially, until Mason cut him out of the child's
life."' The court determined that Mason, Breit, and the child were
a "family unit" protected by the statute.' Thus, the court applied
Virginia Code section 20-49.1(B)(2).'
2. Equal Protection and Due Process
The court next addressed Breit's argument regarding a viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the Assisted
Conception Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause but,
if not harmonized with a statute that allows an unmarried father
parentage rights, would violate the Due Process Clause.'92 Breit
argued, and the court agreed, that if the Assisted Conception Act
was applied as Mason wished, without being in harmony with
Virginia Code section 20-49.1, the Act would have violated his
constitutionally protected right to make decisions concerning the
"care, custody, and control of his child.""
The parent-child relationship is protected under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.'94 Both married and unmarried fathers enjoy this
right by showing "a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, his interest in personal contact with his child."' Thus,
since Breit showed a commitment to raising and having a rela-
tionship with the child, the court held that Breit had the funda-
mental right to make decisions concerning the child's "care, cus-
tody and control, despite his status as an unmarried donor."96
The court stated that, "[s]imply put, there is no compelling reason
why a responsible, involved, unmarried, biological parent should
never be allowed to establish legal parentage of her or his child
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 721-22.
193. Id. at 721.
194. Id. at 721 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott,
725 S.E.2d 555, 558 (Va. 2012); Copeland v. Todd, 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (Va. 2011)).
195. Id. (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)).
196. Id. at 722.
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born as a result of assisted conception.""' The court concluded
that "[d]ue process requires that unmarried parents such as
Breit, who have demonstrated a full commitment to the responsi-
bilities of parenthood, be allowed to enter into voluntary agree-
ments regarding the custody and care of their children.""' The
court stated that
it is incumbent on courts to see that the best interests of a child pre-
vail, particularly when one parent intends to deprive the child of a
relationship with the other parent. "The preservation of the family,
and in particular the parent-child relationship, is an important goal
for not only the parents but also government itself .... ."
The court also noted that preventing Breit's name from appear-
ing on the birth certificate violated the Due Process Clause.200 The
court noted that the purpose of the birth certificate is to show an
intended parent-child relationship and under Virginia Code sec-
tion 32.1-257(D), Breit was entitled to have his name listed on the
child's birth certificate.20 '
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the court
of appeals' decision that Breit was entitled to parental rights over
the child, despite the fact that Breit was not married to the
child's mother.20 2 In doing so, the court took a big step in family
law by putting the value of a child having two parents above the
state's motive in promoting and preserving traditional marriage.
In response to L.F. v. Breit, the Virginia General Assembly codi-
fied the opinion in Virginia Code section 1-240.1, the Rights of
Parents Act.202 Section 1-240.1 states, "A parent has a fundamen-
tal right to make decisions concerning the upbringing, education,
and care of the parent's child."204
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 723 (quoting Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Res., 265 S.E.2d 692, 695
(Va. 1980)).
200. Id. at 723-24 .
201. Id. at 724.
202. Id.
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-240.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013) ('That it is the expressed intent of
the General Assembly that this act codify the opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
L.F. v. Breit, issued on January 10, 2013, as it relates to parental rights."').
204. Id.
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VI. APPLICATION OF L.F. V. BREIT TO GAY COUPLES
The decision in L.F. v. Breit regarding unmarried parents' pa-
rental rights and the subsequent Rights of Parents Act should
open the door not only to unmarried heterosexual parents, but al-
so to homosexual parents who seek to have a child through as-
sisted conception. Both parents should be allowed to enter into
binding surrogacy agreements and both parent's names should be
allowed to be placed on birth certificates, granting them parental
rights. The Due Process Clause should require that a gay man,
similar to the father in Breit, who is unmarried but has demon-
strated a full commitment to parenthood, be allowed to enter into
voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of his chil-
dren, even if he is not biologically related to the child.205
A. The Parent-Child Relationship Is a Fundamental Right for
Parents and Children Regardless of Biological Connection
A gay male parent who has demonstrated a commitment to the
responsibilities of raising a child should have the protection of the
Due Process Clause in his relationship with his child. As the Breit
court stated, "[t]he relationship between a parent and child is a
constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 06 The United States Su-
preme Court has recognized that parental rights do not arise sole-
ly from the biological link between the child and parent.207 In-
stead, "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to partici-
pate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact
with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Pro-
cess Clause."0
Many states, such as Wisconsin and New Jersey, have recog-
nized third parties, who have neither adopted nor are biologically
related to the child, as legal parents under a psychological parent
205. Cf. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 722 (ruling that due process requires that unmarried par-
ents who demonstrate a commitment to parenthood be allowed to enter into voluntary cus-
tody agreements).
206. Id. at 721 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott,
725 S.E.2d 555, 558 (Va. 2012)).
207. Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)).
208. Id. (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261).
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standard.20 9 In V.C. v. M.J.B., for example, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey set a standard that allows "all persons who have will-
ingly, and with the approval of the legal parent, undertaken the
duties of a parent to a child not related by blood or adoption" to
have parental rights."o The court adopted the de facto parenting
test created in the Wisconsin Supreme Court case Holtzman v.
Knott.2 1' This test established four necessary elements for de facto
parenting: (1) the legal parent consented to the parent-like rela-
tionship with the third party; (2) the third party and the child
lived in the same household; (3) the petitioner assumed the re-
sponsibilities of a parent by taking care of the child by supporting
the child's education and development and by providing financial
support; and (4) the third party has had a relationship with the
child long enough to have established a "bonded, dependent rela-
tionship parental in nature."2 " An individual parent who meets
these elements and who has neither adopted nor is biologically re-
lated to the child can be granted similar parental rights to biolog-
ically related or adoptive parents.2 3 Granting parental rights
through this de facto test allows the state to remain unbiased to-
wards those of various sexual orientations, while also preserving
the state's interest in maintaining the family.
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that parental rights
should apply to Breit as the unmarried father of the child because
he had shown a "full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood."2 " By adopting this standard, the court acknowl-
edged that something beyond genetics is needed to establish par-
entage of a child born through ART. Virginia should take the
court's decision a step further. Virginia should join other states
such as New Jersey and Wisconsin and establish a psychological
parent standard when determining parental rights. This stand-
ard should look at the responsibilities the parent is willing to
take on and the relationship between the parent and the child,
regardless of genetic connection.m The court in Breit stated, "we
209. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541-42 (N.J. 2000); Holtzman v. Knott (In
re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
210. Id. (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 551 (citing Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421).
212. Id. (quoting Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421).
213. See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 420-21, 436-37 (discussing parental rights for a
non-biological parent in the context of visitation rights).
214. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013).
215. Cf. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550-51 (N.J. 2000) (laying out standards to be-
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recognize that children also have a liberty interest in establishing
relationships with their parents."21 If this is true, by not estab-
lishing a psychological parent standard or something similar,
Virginia is denying many children, raised by gay dads, their liber-
ty interest in having a relationship with both of their parents.
Restricting a child to one legal parent when, in fact, the child is
being raised by two caring adults, clearly violates this liberty in-
terest.
As the Supreme Court of Virginia applied this protection to a
parent-child relationship under the Due Process Clause to Breit,
so too should Virginia apply this protection to gay dads. Breit's
commitment to parenthood as a biological father is no different
from a non-biological father who has shown a "full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood."2 17 The sexual orientations of
Breit and a gay parent have no effect on their ability to commit to
parenthood. Thus, like in Breit, the Due Process Clause should
protect gay male fathers' fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the "custody and care of their child" regardless of their
genetic relation to their child."'
B. Equal Protection for Parent-Child Relationship of Gay Fathers
Post-Windsor
The protection provided by the Due Process Clause for the par-
ent-child relationship of unmarried fathers should extend to gay
fathers because granting the protection to an unmarried straight
father who had a child through ARTs and not an unmarried gay
man raising a child conceived by ARTs would be to withhold this
right based on sexual orientation.
Although equal protection jurisprudence does not prohibit the
states from treating various classes and groups of people differ-
ently, those classifications must be reasonable.2 19 Even though the
United States Supreme Court has not recognized sexual orienta-
come a psychological parent).
216. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 723 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Gray v. Johnson, 376 S.E.2d
787, 791 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)).
217. Id. at 721.
218. Id. at 722.
219. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rodgers-Miller, supra
note 17, at 298.
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tion as a suspect class, homosexuals have been the victims of hate
crimes and have been publicly ostracized for decades, qualifying
them as a politically unpopular group.' In United States v.
Windsor, the Court held "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equali-
ty 'must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate
treatment of that group."22 ' To bar a father who is fully committed
to raising his child created through assisted conception from due
process protection of his parent-child relationship simply because
of his sexual orientation would be to harm him based on his sexu-
al orientation. The Equal Protection Clause should allow gay fa-
thers of children conceived through ARTs the due process protec-
tion provided in Virginia Code section 1-240.1.222
The Windsor Court additionally stated that responsibilities and
rights enhance the dignity of people, and to deprive people of
their rights and responsibilities unequally creates instability.22
As the Court wrote, the federal Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") demeaned same-sex couples and humiliated the tens of
thousands of children being raised by these couples in not recog-
nizing their legal marriages.2 4 "The law in question makes it even
more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and
closeness of their own family and its concord with other families
in their community and in their daily lives."225
This reasoning should be applied to parental rights as well. To
bar children from having two legal parents even though they are
being raised and cared for by two parents is a state-imposed form
of humiliation and discrimination. Restricting children to only
one legal parent also makes it more difficult for children to un-
derstand the integrity of the family. They may not understand
why they are prevented from having two legal parents simply be-
cause their parents are homosexual, while other children with
heterosexual parents are allowed two legal parents. Similar to
220. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Romer nowhere suggested that
the Court recognized [homosexuals as] a new suspect class."); Rodgers-Miller, supra note
17, at 299-300.
221. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. -,_,_133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008); id. §§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
223. Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
224. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
225. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
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DO1VIA creating second-tier marriages, the Assisted Conception
Act creates second-tier families. 26 To bar a child from two legal
parents simply because of his or her parents' sexual orientation is
discrimination and should be seen as causing humiliation for
children being raised by these parents in the eyes of the state.
In the recent case of Bostic v. Rainey, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Virginia's
laws banning same-sex marriage are unconstitutional.22 7 The
court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that parenting is a
legitimate reason for banning same-sex couples from marrying. 12
In defending Virginia's marriage laws, proponents argued that
"responsible procreation" and "optimal childrearing" are sufficient
state interests to allow Virginia to prohibit same-sex couples from
marrying.229 The Commonwealth contended that natural parents
should also be the legal parents.2 o In disagreeing with this argu-
ment the court stated:
[Tihe welfare of our children is a legitimate state interest. However,
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails to further this inter-
est. Instead, needlessly stigmatizing and humiliating children who
are being raised by the loving couples targeted by Virginia's Mar-
riage Laws betrays that interest.. . . [Tihousands of children being
raised by same-sex couples, [are] needlessly deprived of the protec-
tion, the stability, the recognition and the legitimacy that marriage
231
conveys.
The court noted that homosexual couples are just as capable of
raising children as heterosexual couples, and to hold otherwise is
"unconstitutional, hurtful and unfounded.", 2 The court further
opined that, "state-sanctioned preference for one model of parent-
ing that uses two adults over another model of parenting that us-
es two adults is constitutionally infirm."2 33
This rationale regarding parenting and marriage laws should
apply to the Assisted Conception Act. Similar to limiting mar-
riage to only between a man and woman, narrowly defining in-
226. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
227. Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978, at *23 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014).
228. Id. at *17-18.
229. Id. at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. at *18.
231. Id. at *18.
232. Id. at *18-19.
233. Id. at *19.
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tended parents in Virginia Code section 20-156 to only a married
man and woman is unconstitutional because it essentially asserts
that homosexual couples cannot be good parents.2 34 As the East-
ern District Court of Virginia stated, homosexual couples are just
as capable of being good parents as heterosexual couples. 235 Deny-
ing children the ability to have two legal parents under the As-
sisted Conception Act deprives them of the protection, stability,
and legitimacy that having two legally-recognized parents pro-
vides."' Children deserve to have the benefits and security of two
legal parents and denying that benefit discriminates against
these children based on the sexual orientation of their parents. If
the state holds the welfare of children as an interest, then the
state must remedy this humiliation and discrimination by allow-
ing children of gay couples to have two legal parents through sec-
ond-parent adoption or revision of the Assisted Conception Act.
C. Surrogacy Agreements and Birth Certificates Should Be
Constitutionally Protected
In L.F. v. Breit, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[d]ue
process requires that unmarried parents such as Breit, who have
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood, be allowed to enter into voluntary agreements re-
garding the custody and care of their children."m The court de-
termined that not allowing Breit to enter into a Virginia Code
section 29-49.1 agreement and denying him parentage on the
birth certificate merely because he is an unmarried sperm donor
for a child conceived through ARTs violates his constitutionally
protected right to a parent-child relationship.2 38
This reasoning should also be applied to surrogacy agreements.
By not allowing a homosexual male, especially one who is not ge-
netically related to a child conceived through ARTs, to enter into
an approved surrogacy contract in Virginia because he cannot ful-
fill the definition of "intended parents" precludes him from a legal
means of establishing parentage of his child should the surrogate
decide to maintain her parental rights. This prohibition should
234. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008).
235. Bostic, 2014 WL 561978, at *18.
236. Id.
237. 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013).
238. Id.
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not withstand constitutional scrutiny. An unmarried homosexual
male who has demonstrated a full commitment to raising a child
should be free to enter into an approved agreement with a surro-
gate in order to retain his constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship, and it should reflect a pure intent perspective.
The intent test was established in Johnson v. Calvert, a Cali-
fornia case from 1993.2" In this case, the intent test was used to
determine maternal parentage when, under state law, two wom-
en qualified to be the mother of one child.240 Intent is determined
by who was responsible for the initial fertilization of the embryo
and who initially intended to raise the child.24 ' It is also known as
the "but for" test-but for the intended mother's acted-on inten-
tion, the child would not be in existence.2 42 This standard allows
the truly intentional parents, regardless of gender, sexual orien-
tation, or marriage status, to gain parental rights. The intent test
directly affects the parties' constitutional claims.243 Since gesta-
tional carriers or mere donors are not the "but for" factor creating
the child, they are barred from claims for parental rights under
the Constitution.2 " The intent test is an unambiguous and neu-
tral standard for establishing parentage that assures parties to
surrogacy agreements that the intended outcome will be unde-
terred.24 '
By adopting the intent test as applied in Johnson, Virginia
would eliminate many issues surrounding surrogacy agreements
and parentage rights for gay couples. If the law defined parents of
the child born by ARTs as the parties whose intent was the rea-
son the child was born, regardless of the parties' gender, marital
status, or sexual orientation, then the surrogacy agreement
would be protected under the constitution from outsider's claims
for parental rights.
Finally, the analysis regarding the father's right to appear on
the birth certificate under the Fifth Amendment in L.F. v. Breit
should also apply to any intended fathers under Virginia Code
239. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
240. Id. at 779; Dana, supra note 15, at 367.
241. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; Dana, supra note 15, at 367.
242. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; Dana, supra note 15, at 367.
243. See Dana, supra note 15, at 368.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citations omitted).
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section 32.1-257(D).2 4 6 Preventing an unmarried gay father from
appearing on the birth certificate violates his constitutionally
protected right to a parent-child relationship since parentage on a
birth certificate shows intent of a parent-child relationship.24 7
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The definition of "intended parents" in the Assisted Conception
Act violates gay male couples' constitutionally protected right to a
parent-child relationship. To remedy this constitutional violation,
Virginia should amend the definition of "intended parents" in the
Assisted Conception Act so that unmarried gay males may enter
into approved surrogacy agreements in Virginia." The definition
of "intended parents" in Virginia Code section 20-156 should be
amended to simply reflect the intent of the parties, rather than
marital status, genetic relationship to the child, or gender status
in establishing parentage. The statute should state that "intend-
ed parents" are individuals whose intent is to create a child, and
without whom no parent-child relationship would exist. This
would overcome the constitutional violation of an unmarried
male's right to make decisions concerning his child's interests, re-
gardless of his genetic relationship to the child, because he would
now be able to enter into an approved surrogacy agreement with
the protections those contracts provide in Virginia.
Another potential solution is to allow second-parent adoption in
Virginia. Senator Janet D. Howell sponsored Senate Bill 336,
which would allow for a second-parent adoption." This bill came
before the Virginia General Assembly in January 2014.250 The bill
states:
[a] person other than the parent of a child may adopt a child if (i) ...
the child had only one parent or the child is the result of surrogacy
and the surrogate or carrier consents to the adoption, (ii) the petition
does not seek to terminate the parental rights of the parent of the
246. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
247. See L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 724 (Va. 2013).
248. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 314.
249. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adop-
tion Head to 2014 GA with Bi-Partisan Support, GAYRVA.coM (Jan. 10, 2014), http://
www.gayrva.com/news-views/bills-to-allow-second-parent-adoption-head-to-2014-ga-with-
bi-partisan-support/ [hereinafter Bills to Allow Second Parent Adoption].
250. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adop-
tion, supra note 249.
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child, and (iii) the parent of the child joins the petition for the pur-
pose indicating consent.
The purpose of this bill is to provide security to children of both
straight and gay couples living in two-parent families with only
one legal parent.25 This bill would create an option for a gay dad,
who is not genetically related to his child, to gain parental rights
alongside his partner.5 On January 24, 2014, the bill was dead-
locked in the Senate and thus killed during the 2014 legislative
- 254session.
If Virginia values a child's right to have two parents over its in-
terest in promoting traditional marriage, the Commonwealth
must redefine the Assisted Conception Act or approve second-
parent adoption. Virginia should allow for a child to have two ful-
ly committed gay fathers rather than restricting a child to only
one legal gay parent.
Lauren Maxey *
251. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adop-
tion, supra note 249.
252. Bills to Allow Second Parent Adoption, supra note 249.
253. Id.
254. John Riley, Virginia Senate Kills Second-Parent Adoption Bill, METROWEEKLY
(D.C.), (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2014/01/virginia-senate-slau
ghters-second-parent-adoption.html.
255. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 721 (Va. 2013).
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